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ACTORS IN PRIVATE FOOD REGULATION: TAKING RESPONSI­
BILITY OR PASSING THE BUCK TO SOMEONE ELSE?*
Tetty Havinga 
Abstract
In recent years, retailers and their organizations are playing an active role in food safety 
regulation. They initiated several private food safety standards and compelled suppliers of 
food products to comply with these standards. Which actors are involved in decision-making 
in this type of private food regulation? This question is important for problems of effective­
ness, legitimacy and accountability. Several categories of private actors are distinguished 
based on their position in the regulatory arrangement. Private regulatory arrangements do 
develop in course of time; in different stages of their development other actors may be in­
volved. Finally, we distinguish between direct (in person) and indirect (representation) partici­
pation in decision making.
Some cases of retail-driven private food safety arrangements are examined.
Key words
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INTRODUCTION
Traditional command-and-control regulation by the state has been criticized for 
being ineffective, inflexible and neglecting the responsibilities of citizens and 
organizations. In food safety regulation, as elsewhere, alternative forms of 
regulation are being explored, such as self-regulation, co-regulation, manage­
ment-based regulation and private systems of governance (Aalders &  Wiltha- 
gen 1997; Braithwaite 1982; Coglianese &  Lazer 2003; Furger 1997; Gun- 
ningham &  Sinclair 1999; Hutter 2001: 9-10). Many of these new forms of 
regulation are characterised by a mix of public and private organisations in­
volved in rule-making, monitoring compliance, and enforcement. This transition 
from public to private regulation gives rise to important new theoretical and 
political problems of legitimacy, accountability and effectiveness (Van Kers­
bergen &  Van W aarden 2001; Newman 2001) and challenges existing con­
ceptualisations of regulation (Black 2002; Sinclair 1 997).
In this paper I want to explore which actors are involved in decision-making 
in private and mixed forms of food regulation. This question is important for at 
least two reasons. First, private regulation is supposed to be better than tradi­
tional command and control regulation, that is, more effective at lower costs. 
Some of the assumed advantages of private regulation are based on the sup­
position that private regulation is self-regulation, regulating your own actions. 
Self-regulation is advantageous because requirements are based on everyday
T.Havinga@jur.ru.nl. This paper is prepared for the Symposium on Private Governance 
in the Global Agro-Food System 23-25 April 2008, Münster Germany.
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work and inside knowledge; this will prevent practical obstacles in implementa­
tion and application. Moreover it is supposed that ‘own’ rules will be accepted 
more easily and will have a higher level of compliance. However, most docu­
mented instances of self-regulation are not ‘pure’ self-regulatory because they 
are under some kind of surveillance of government agencies, e.g. in the field of 
environmental policy and safety and health policy. Moreover there is often the 
implicit threat of imposed government regulation in case this ‘associational’ 
self-regulation would become derailed (De Vroom 1 990; Gunningham 1 995; 
Gunningham &  Rees 1997; Grant 1987: 189 ff.; Havinga &  Jettinghoff 1999; 
Streeck &  Schmitter 1985: 19-20). Traditionally, private regulations are 
thought to originate from industry (industry association). Private regulations 
may also originate from an external organisation such as a powerful trade 
partner or a non-governmental organisation (Havinga 2006). The question is to 
what extent are regulated firms involved in rule-making and monitoring? And 
what are the consequences of this?
A second reason for exploring the involvement of actors is the issue of le­
gitimacy and accountability of the regulation. In particular, because some forms 
of regulation are not pure self-regulation, but regulation by private parties 
imposed on other actors, the question is how this type of regulation can be le­
gitimized.
Participation of regulated industry in decision-making in the regulatory ar­
rangement is essential and risky at the same time. From the perspective of ef­
fectiveness of the regulatory arrangement it is highly important that regulated 
industry has a say in the standards and their interpretation and application. 
For constructing trust in a regulatory arrangement however it is important that 
regulated industry is not too powerful. A regulatory arrangement were regu­
lated industry monopolizes the decision-making process will be criticized for 
being in the interest of industry only, neglecting other interests. From the per­
spective of democratic legitimacy, next to the participation of all regulated 
industries, in particular the participation of other stakeholders such as consumer 
organisations or NGOs is vital.
ACTORS IN REGULATORY ARRANGEMENTS
In analysing the involvement of different categories of actors in private regula­
tion, three distinctions have to be made: categories of actors, phases of regula­
tion and forms of participation.
Three broad categories of actors are involved in regulation: state actors, 
industry and third parties such as NGOs or civil society. However, for analyzing 
the involvement of actors in private systems of food regulation a more sophisti­
cated categorisation of private actors is needed. For effectiveness and for le­
gitimacy it is important to distinguish between private actors which are regu­
lated (regulatees), private actors which are part of the production chain but
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are not regulated themselves by the regulation at hand such as suppliers and 
retailers, private actors providing services to the regaled industry such as certi­
fication and auditing business, and private actors outside the production chain 
such as NGOs and consumers. For this purpose we take all state actors together 
as public actors such as national or European legislators, inspectorates, and 
departments.
In analysing the involvement of actors in decision-making in regulatory ar­
rangements it is not only important to distinguish between different categories 
of participants, but also between the phases of regulation. Bernstein and 
Cashore (2007) showed for non-state market driven governance systems that 
political legitimacy is constructed in a three-phase-process with different rela­
tionships between the actors and participation of different actors. Bernstein 
and Cashore distinguish between the initiation phase, the phase of widespread 
support and the phase of political legitimacy.
Van Amstel (2007: 71) distinguishes two forms of participation in the stan­
dardization process of an eco-label: direct and indirect. Direct participation is 
attending public hearings, suggesting changes in the labelling scheme and 
other forms of direct involvement. Indirect participation is being represented 
(by someone from your industry association or NGO ) in a standardization 
body or advisory board. Direct participation is involvement in person, whereas 
indirect participation is being represented in the decision making procedure.
RETAIL FOOD SAFETY ARRANGEMENTS
In recent years, retailers and their organizations are playing an active role in 
food safety regulation. Retailers are making higher demands on suppliers with 
respect to production processes, product specifications and the use of raw ma­
terial. Particularly big supermarket chains developed initiatives to commit their 
suppliers to strict food safety regulations and to harmonize food safety stan­
dards globally.
This process of globalization of retail-driven food safety standards for 
suppliers follows the pattern of bottom-up globalization of regulation. Some 
business change practice to solve a problem, others model this new practice, 
this results in globalization of the new standard of practice. As Braithwaite & 
Drahos (2000: 554) point out ‘rather than business practice following from 
norms and rules, often mechanisms of modeling delivers globalization of prac­
tice which is subsequently codified in rules’. Next to this bottom-up globaliza­
tion there is at the same time a pattern of top-down globalization of food 
safety regulation in the Codex Commission and the European Union.
Retailers are increasingly powerful in the food chain. The market share of 
big supermarket chains has increased considerably because of mergers and 
concentration. A high proportion of groceries, vegetables, fruits, meat and 
dairy produce are sold in supermarkets. Suppliers are dependent on super­
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market chains and have to comply with their requirements (Boselie c.s. 2003; 
Grievink c.s. 2002; Marsden c.s 1 997; Havinga 2006).
Retailers and their organisations have an interest in guaranteeing the safe­
ty and quality of food and they perceive a shared fate with manufacturers 
and concurring retailers: when consumers lose confidence in a particular prod­
uct such as veal (BSE), this affects all firms in the product chain including the 
supermarkets, even if they are not to blame for the problem. The last decade 
big supermarket chains developed several initiatives to commit their suppliers 
to strict food safety regulations.
Retailers position themselves as protecting the interests of consumers and 
public health. Consumers are said to demand an absolute guarantee for safe 
food and retailers want to keep their customers satisfied. Retailers present an 
image of social responsibility in assuring food safety and regaining trust of 
consumers. Retailers have criticized national and transnational legislators and 
food industry for being too lenient and not taking appropriate action. W hat is 
the role of food industry and growers in this type of private regulation? And 
do consumers organisations, NGOs and governmental organisations participate 
in regulatory decision-making?
In answering these questions we will examine actor participation in some 
cases of private food governance initiated by retailers: British retail consortium 
and alternative retailers food safety standards, G lobalGap, and the Global 
Food Safety Initiative. I rely heavily on information the private governance 
schemes themselves provide on their web sites.
British Retail Consortium Global standard for food safety
Fifteen or twenty years ago, food safety was not an important issue for most 
supermarket organizations in the Netherlands and probably elsewhere. At that 
time, Dutch supermarkets did not have food safety programs nor a food safety 
adviser or department. This changed dramatically since. In the 1 990-s some 
supermarket organizations generated their own comprehensive quality assur­
ance scheme including unexpected inspections at farms, gardens and plants 
(e.g. Tesco and Sainsbury in the United Kingdom, Albert Heijn in the Nether- 
lands).1 Motives to engage in this regulatory activity were twofold: to reduce 
risks and liability costs, and to inspire confidence to consumers.
The British Retailer Consortium (BRC) started to develop a common food 
safety standard. The BRC standard of the British supermarkets contains com­
prehensive norms with regard to food safety and quality systems, product and 
process management, and personal hygiene of personnel.2 The standard ap ­
plies to manufacturers of retailers own brand food products. The standard ad ­
1 See Havinga & Jettinghoff 1999 for a description of the quality system of the Dutch
leading supermarket Albert Heijn in 1994.
2 The most recent version of this standard is ‘BRC Global Standard for Food Safety, issue
5’ 2008, http/www.brc.org.uk.
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dresses part of the due diligence requirements of both the supplier and the 
retailer.
The harmonization of food safety standards by retailers is supposed to 
have advantages for retailers as well as for suppliers.
‘W ork on the BRC Global Standard first began in 1 996, when UK r e- 
tailers realised that on the issue of food safety, there were many a d ­
vantages to sharing experience and developing robust systems to ­
gether. (...) The development of the BRC G lobal Standards was ini­
tially driven by the need to meet legislative requirements, but was 
quickly seen as having significant benefits to the suppliers of product to 
UK retailers.’3
Retailers expected legal, technical and financial advantages. The standard 
was developed to assist retailers in their fulfillment of legal obligations and 
protection of the consumer. Retailers have a legal obligation to take all rea­
sonable precautions and exercise all due diligence in the avoidance of failure. 
This includes the verification of technical performance at food production sites 
of retailer branded products. The aims of the BRC Global Standards are to 
improve supplier standards and consistency and avoid product failure, to elimi­
nate multiple audit of food manufacturers, to support retailer objectives at all 
levels of the supply chain and to provide concise information to assist with a 
due diligence defense.4 The standard is regularly reviewed, issue 5 of this 
standard was published in January 2008. The name of the standard has been 
changed to ‘Global Standard for Food Safety’. In a private food safety certi­
fication scheme like BRC, the costs of inspections and certification are for the 
supplier (and not for the retailer). In an interview one of my respondents said:
‘The British retailers presented a system with the supplier paying the 
audit and the retailer receiving a specific report without paying a 
penny.’
For supermarkets it is much cheaper and easier to require suppliers to comply 
with a food safety standard than to maintain your own quality assurance sys­
tem. Some respondents commented that supermarkets first required their sup­
pliers to implement a food safety system, while not implementing similar meas­
ures in their own supermarket organisation. The succession of BRC standards 
illustrates this. In 1 998 the first standard was introduced, the food standard for 
manufacturers of own brand foods. In 2002 the Packaging Standard was pub­
lished, followed by the Consumer Products standard in 2003 and finally the
3 www.brc.org.uk/standards/about_background.htm (2005-02-18).
4 www.brc.org.uk/standards/background.htm (2004-06-21).
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BRC Standard Storage and Distribution in 2006. The last standard addresses 
‘companies storing and/or distributing food, consumer goods and packaging 
materials’. This is the only Standard that is applicable to retail-organisations 
storing and distributing products. The first three standards applied to suppliers 
of retailers, not to retailers themselves.
The first issues of the BRC Food standard seem to be developed by retail­
ers only. A director of a certification agency regarded it an important disad­
vantage the BRC standard is formulated without consultation of the food indus­
try.
‘BRC is a pure retail initiative. It was never communicated and attuned 
to other parties. (...) If you want to use certification as an instrument to 
regulate the market, you should consult market parties. In case of a 
one-sided imposed regulation, industry could say: we will not do that. 
W e ll, they cannot because the other party of course is very dominant 
in the market. So they will have to comply. But, I doubt if this proce­
dure makes a good document. Involvement of all parties increases the 
social support and market parties will more easily join in.’ (interview 
2005)
Over the years other stakeholders became involved in setting the BRC standard 
(perhaps due to requirements of the Accreditation council). The British Retail 
Consortium states that representatives from major retailers, manufacturers, cer­
tification bodies, United Kingdom Accreditation Service (UKAS) and trade asso­
ciations contributed to the standard that was developed ‘under the leadership 
of the BRC and its members’.5 The website of BRC does not provide information 
on the members of the Technical Advisory Committee and the Standards Gov­
ernance and Strategy Committee. It is clear however that the BRC still has a 
decisive voice. The standard is still owned by the British Retail Consortium.
The BRC standard is not only important in the UK, also retailers in other 
European countries and worldwide accept suppliers who have gained certifica­
tion to the BRC global standard. However, the BRC standard did not succeed in 
becoming the only or most important global standard.
Food standards from German, French and American retailers
The German retailers from the HDE (Hauptverband des Deutschen Einzelhan­
dels) choose in 2002 to define their own standard, the International Food 
Standard (IFS). It may have contributed that German (and other) retailers did 
not succeed in influencing the BRC standard. A comparative analysis of the dif­
5 www.brc.org.uk/standards/default.asp?mainsection_i=1&subsection_id=1 (28-3-2008); 
similar but not mentioning UKAS and major retailers: 
www.brc.org.uk/standards/about_background.htm (2005-02-18).
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ferences between the BRC global standard and the International Food Stan­
dard, notices a cultural difference between Germany &  France and the UK: For 
UK retailers the main drive for third party auditing is to cover due diligence 
defense and ensure that suppliers maintain appropriate control. For French and 
German retailers the main drive is to have a uniform and comparable high 
quality and transparent audit report (that this constitutes an element to defend 
themselves is seen as a consequence).6 In 2003 the French retailers from the 
FCD (Fédération des entreprises du Commerce et de la Distribution) joined the 
IFS Working group, which resulted in a revised version of this standard. The IFS 
is currently owned by the German and the French associations of supermar­
kets.7 They seek to establish IFS throughout Europe.8
The IFS Working Group is the deciding organ. At the start the Working 
Group members were German retailers, since 2003 German and French re­
tailers. The Working Group receives recommendation from the Review Commit­
tee. ‘This Review Committee shall be formed with all participants involved in the 
audit process this includes the members of the Working Group (retailers), rep­
resentatives of the industry and certification bodies.’
The American supermarkets decided not to develop their own food safety 
standard, nor to join a standards owned by platform organizations of Euro­
pean retailers. Instead, at the request of its retail members in 2003 the Ameri­
can Food Marketing Institute acquired the Australian food safety standard 
SQF.9 The Safe Quality Food certification program was developed in 1 994 
and formerly owned by the West-Australian Department of Agriculture. The 
Department of Agriculture aimed to enhance the international competitiveness 
of West-Australian agricultural industries by working with them to meet the in­
creasingly demanding standards for safety and quality of food and fibre 
products. At the moment, I do not know why they sold the SQF to the United 
States.
The Food Marketing Institute conducts programs in research, education, 
food safety, industrial relations and public affairs on behalf of its 1,500 mem­
bers (food retailers and wholesalers). Membership represents three-quarters of
6 Analyzing similarities and differences between 2 retail driven standards: BRC Global 
standard Food version 202 - International Food Standard version 4, International Sup­
plier Auditing bv, 2004.
7 On behalf of the HDE and FCD the HDE Trade Services GmbH was assigned to take 
over the administration of the IFS. It cooperates with the Working Group and the repre­
sentatives of the HDE and FCD.
(http://www.foodcare.info/index.php?SID=e4217d08cec4e96a9aff73fec71a65e5&p 
age=home&content=interne_ organisation (17-04-2008).
8 http://www.food-
care.info/index.php?SID=1 31 86f293b25bfebfab737dd80a92803&page=home 
&content=basisinfo (2005-02-23). The IFS standard version 4 (February 2004) is avail­
able in German, French, English, Dutch, Polish, Italian and Spanish.
9 www.sqfi.com/sqf_program.htm (16-2-2005).
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all retail food stores in the US. International membership includes 200 compa­
nies from over 50 countries.10
The current SQF Technical Committee is to review the SQF Codes (stan­
dards) and ‘will include representatives from throughout the food supply chain 
to ensure an open and transparent process for all stakeholders.’11 This suggests 
a less retail-dominated committee than BRC and IFS. However, the members of 
the Technical Committee are 9 retailers, 2 restaurants/caterers, 2 food manu­
facturers and 4 other technical experts.12 The conclusion is that retailers are in 
the majority in this advisory committee, and probably even more in the SQF 
Institute that formally decides. Food manufacturers have a small voice, con­
sumer organizations are not represented at all. Ten out of 17 members are 
from the USA (2 Australia, 1 from UK, South Africa, Canada, Belgium and Sin­
gapore).
The actors participating in the SQF scheme changed completely by the 
transfer from the Western Australian Department of Agriculture to the US re­
tailers platform FMI.
From Eurepgap to Global Gap
Another retailer initiative in food safety governance is EurepGap.13 Eurep (Eu­
ropean Retailer Produce Working Group) was established by European retail­
ers in 1 997 to promote food safety. British retailers and supermarkets in conti­
nental Europe were the driving forces. This initiative resulted in the EurepGap 
protocol for fruit and vegetables. EurepGap norms include more issues than the 
BRC standard such as occupational health and safety and animal well-being. 
Market-gardeners and their organizations can be certified for EurepGap.
In contrast with the retail food safety standards BRC, IFS and SQF, a new 
organization was established not part of or associated with existing retailers 
organizations. After 10 years the Board decided to change its brand. Eurep- 
gap has become G lobalGap to reflect its expanding international role in es­
tablishing Good Agricultural Practices mutually agreed between multiple re­
tailers and their suppliers. G lobalGap is a private sector body that sets volun­
tary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe.
In 10 years time Eurepgap developed from a retailer initiative to an equal 
partnership between retailers and agricultural producers to GlobalGap. In 
2001 it is said: ‘the organization is no longer driven by the retailers and has 
developed into a much more democratic organization that makes decisions that 
are in the best interest of the entire supply chain and ultimately the consumer: it
10 www.fmi.org/about (11 -04-2008).
11 SQFI Notice no 1, The SQ F Program under FMI, 1 September 2003 ( 2005), p. 1.
12 www.sqfi.com/committees_members.htm (28-3-2008)
13 EurepGap stands for ‘Euro retailer produce working group Good agricultural practice’.
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has become a supply chain partnership.’14 Both the Steering Committee and the 
Technical and Standards Committee are established in 2001 and have 50 %  
retailer and 50 %  grower representation.15 Both Committees are constituted by 
Eurepgap members; members are elected by closed ballot of current retailer 
and supplier members, each constituency electing their own representatives. 
Next to retailers and suppliers/growers there are associate members from the 
input and service side of agriculture, they are not part of the Eurepgap deci­
sion making process. June 2003 Eurepgap had 22 official European retail 
members, and 87 grower members (59 European, 9 African, 8 Asian, &  Ameri­
can and 4 Oceanian). In 2008 Globalgap still has these three different types 
of memberships: 37 retail and food service members (European except for one 
Japanese), 140 producer/supplier members (36 from outside Europe) and 113 
associate members such as certification bodies, consulting and crop protection 
industry.16 Members have active participatory rights, they participate in stan­
dard setting and decision making and have a say in the approving procedure 
of benchmarking other standards. G lobalGap ‘firmly believes in local multi­
stakeholder support and adaptation for GAP standards.’. .  For this purpose 
National Technical Working Groups are established. To ensure global accep­
tance G lobalGap actively engages with many different stakeholders and wel­
comes proposals and recommendations from all relevant parties into its stan­
dard development. With the establishment of a Certification Body Committee 
to provide technical feedback from audits and discuss implementation issues. 
Small-scale farmers are often faced with more difficulties to fulfill the require­
ments. G lobalGap has implemented three approaches to facilitate small farm­
ers: group certification, smallholder manual and extra feedback opportunities.
Global Food Safety Initiative
In 2000 a group of international retailers started the Global Food Safety Initi­
ative (GFSI) in order to agree on globally accepted food safety standards. By 
now, four food safety standards have been benchmarked to be in compliance 
with the GFSI Guidance Document.17 Three of these benchmarked standards 
are owned by retailer organizations (BRC, IFS, and SQF). The mission of GFSI is 
to strengthen consumer confidence in the food they buy in retail outlets. In short,
14 www.eurep.org/sites/q_and_a_general_questions (exact date unknown - probably 
autumn 2002).
15 After presenting this paper I found this to be wrong. Growers or primary producers are 
not represented in Global G ap  as I suggest in the paper; supplier members include ex­
port and import firms and wholesale businesses.
16 www2.globalgap.org/members (19-2-2008).
17 The Global Food Safety Initiative Benchmarked Standards: British Retail Consortium, 
Dutch HACCP, (German/French) International Food Standard, and (American/Australian) 
SQF. Three of these standards are owned or established by retail-organisations. NZGap 
is also mentioned as benchmarked standard.
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the GFSI wants a simple set of rules of standards, harmony between countries 
and save money for suppliers.18
January 2003 the GFSI Taskforce, a retailers network of food experts was 
open to all retailers worldwide’ and consisted of 52 members, all retailers. In 
2004 the list counted 46 retailers, mainly from Europe (32) and North America 
(9)19. At that time there were ad hoc meetings from a separate stakeholders 
group from suppliers, certification and accreditation bodies, and standard 
owners. The GFSI Yearbook 2004 says that GFSI aims to involve suppliers 
more in it decision making process in the future, contractual relations will be 
established with the owners of benchmarked standards and an annual meeting 
with standard owners.
January 2005 the Board of directors had 6 retail members predominantly 
from Europe. In 2008 the GFSI Foundation Board still is a retailer-driven group, 
but 2 manufacturer advisory members are added to the retailers and the 
Board has members from Europe (5), USA (3) and China (1). September 2006 
the GFSI Technical Committee replaced the GFSI retailer only Task Force. 
Membership is on invitation, currently (2008) 50 organizations participate in 
the committee. Only 17 are from retail; 18 from certification bodies, standard 
owners or accreditation organizations and 10 food manufacturers. Most mem­
bers are from European countries (41) or USA (10).20 Stakeholders are invited 
to participate through annual meetings; this is open to ‘any interested party 
that would like to have a voice in the GFSI structure’. Retailers are in power in 
the board, but not in the technical committee. For retailers participation has 
become less direct (not every retailer can join the board or technical commit­
tee), indirect participation of manufacturers and the certification industry in the 
technical committee and direct participation through annual meetings for all 
actors.
CONCLUSIONS
The cases show great variety in the development of a private food regulation. 
From regulation originated from one retailer it evolved to regulation of the 
united retailers, monitored by independent certification and inspection organi­
zations. National private certification schemes cross borders and become glob­
al or transnational. Food safety regulation by retailers, until now, is limited to 
private brands and fresh foods, leaving other food products out of the scope 
of the regulation.
From all studied retailer initiatives, EurepGap is the only one that devel­
oped in a not-retailer dominated private food governance. In course of time 
BRC and IFS did include some opportunities for other parties to participate, but
18 Global Food Safety Initiative, Year Book 2004 (www.ciesnet.com).
19 Other members from South Africa (2), Singapore, Israel and Australia.
20 Members from Japan, Hong Kong, South Africa. 54 members from 50 organizations.
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retailers firmly stay in charge. Apparently, there are forces making exclusively 
retailer-led food safety schemes to include also other relevant parties notably 
producers (manufacturers or growers) and certification organizations.
In the SQF case, an Australian governmental (voluntary?) program was 
taken over by American retailers. This take-over resulted in an almost complete 
replacement of participating actors. The Australian program was not directed 
by or at retailers (as far as I know). In this case the initial actors withdraw from 
the regulation, as was the case in the Marine Stewardship Council (initial actor 
Unilever retreated).
Retailers like to present themselves as very social responsible companies 
pursuing the interests of consumers. However, the retailer food safety regula­
tory arrangements do not arrange participation from consumers or their or­
ganisations. Only the Global Food Safety Initiative allows any interested party 
to participate through annual meetings. Some eco-labels (milieukeur, Demeter) 
allow active participation of consumers (Van Amstel 2007: 73)
The cases show retailers setting up regulations for producers (not self­
regulation). This is an easy and cheap way to assure food safety, much 
cheaper than an own assurance system. Besides, the retailer is able to pass on 
responsibility in case something goes wrong. Being social responsible would be 
apparent from developing food safety and quality programs for retailers first 
or together with programs for suppliers. The food safety standards BRC, IFS 
and SQF are forced upon producers of own-branded products (not on all sup­
pliers). This indicates that retailers embarked on this, not primarily because re­
tailers are social responsible, but because they needed to get hold of the qual­
ity and safety of own-brand products. This are not cases of retailers acting 
social responsible, but retailers passing the buck to producers. A cultural differ­
ence between the UK and Germany/France was suggested. This paper does 
not provide information to conclude whether this is a difference in actions taken 
or only another presentation.
G lobalGap is most open over its internal structure. Retailers as well as 
growers working with G lobalGap certification can join the club, choose mem­
bers of the committees and participate in decision-making. G lobalGap is 
probably the most democratic of the described private food regulations. 
G lobalGap is also the only scheme were some organizations of growers from 
developing countries participate and that includes animal welfare and labour 
conditions.
EurepGap did very well, it expanded over the world, became a widely 
accepted standard required by many supermarkets and included other agrar­
ian products next to the original fruits and vegetables. However, not only 
Eurepgap did well. BRC standards also expanded. So becoming more democ­
ratic is not a prerequisite for growth.
A final word has to be said on private food safety standards as voluntary 
standards. One could argue that compliance with a private standard is volun­
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tary. A food producer is not legally obliged to comply with a private standard. 
However, market forces do force compliance. In many countries such as UK, The 
Netherlands, Germany, France all major retailers require certification of sup­
pliers. A food producer or grower that lacks certification will be economically 
sanctioned. Major parties will not buy his products anymore. Purchasing power 
of supermarkets makes retail food safety standards obligatory for all who 
want to stay in the market. For retailers it is most important to assure against 
all possible risks leaving the costs for the regulated suppliers. This makes par­
ticipation of manufacturers and growers in decision making in food safety 
standards particularly important to safeguard against ever rising requirements. 
Food safety regulation shows expanding expectations. Both private and public 
food regulations extend their scope and aims, not only UK but Europe or world, 
not only safe food but also sustainable, animal welfare.
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